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Tackling Online Fraud 
Prof Alisdair A. Gillespie and Samantha Magor* 
 
Online fraud continues to be one of the most challenging forms of cybercrime. It is an 
extremely varied species of crime, with multiple examples and definitions. The prevalence 
of online fraud is so vast that law enforcement and financial bodies can quickly become 
swamped. The EU recognises the threat that online fraud poses to the Union and has 
passed a new Directive that seeks to tackle online fraud. However, the Directive misses 
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Fraud is one of the oldest and most common forms of cybercrime.1 Of course, fraud has existed 
long before the internet came into existence, and it is a classic example of what Barry Sandwell has 
described as a crime that is generalised and radicalised by the internet.2 That is to say, it is a crime 
that has been changed by the internet in that it has been allowed to grow exponentially as a result 
of the internet’s infrastructure. This article will consider the common forms of cybercrime, and 
identify how the law and law enforcement has responded to this. 
 
1. DEFINING INTERNET FRAUD 
There is no single definition of internet fraud and, as will be seen later, this causes difficulties for 
the law. Perhaps the most comprehensive definition is a typology put forward by Amber Stabek 
and others.3 Seven categories are identified: 
 
1. Fraud through low-level trickery. This could include, for example, advertising non-
existent products.  
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2. Fraud through developed story-based application. This where a person is tricked 
into giving money as part of a story. It is often used in advance-fee scams (discussed 
below). 
3. Participation through employment-based strategies. This is where a person is 
tricked into paying money in anticipation of gaining employment (e.g. for a necessary 
qualification, a vetting fee or a uniform etc). 
4. Fraud through implied necessary obligation. This is where money is taken 
fraudulently when a person does a positive act (e.g. subscribing to a site or telephoning a 
particular number), often without realising the full consequences. 
5. Information gathering through apparently authentic appeals. This could be where, 
for example, a person sets up a fake charity or crowd-funding page for a fictitious problem 
(e.g. a non-existent child who requires expensive medical treatment). 
6. Financial gain through merchant and customer-based exploitation. This can 
include most auction frauds or where a person pretends not to have received goods. 
7. Financial gain through marketing opportunities. So-called ‘Ponzi’ schemes would 
be classic examples of this, or get-rich-quick schemes. 
 
Missing from this list is technology-derived frauds. This would include, for example, ‘formjacking’ 
(where malicious code is used to steal credit card information inserted into legitimate sites), 
‘pharming’ (where a person trying to access a legitimate site is directed towards an illegitimate site) 
or ‘ransomware’ (where a computer, storage device or cloud store is encrypted so that the user 
cannot access their data, with the encryption only being lifted when a ransom is paid). However, 
are these truly frauds or are they another branch of financial crime? 
 
The term ‘fraud’ tends to conjure up the idea of a scam. That is to say, a swindle or trick. The 
seven examples discussed above could be considered scams: they involve person A tricking person 
B. Technology is simply the facilitator. Formjacking, pharming and ransomware are more akin to 
a computer attack than a scam. They have more in common with hacking and malware than the 
law of theft, but instead of causing damage to a system they are designed to lead to financial loss. 
Of course, the distinction is not perfect. Let us take two examples: 
 
A, using malware, directs B to a false site when B tries to buy something on an e-commerce 




C pretends to be a legitimate e-commerce shop. D enters his credit card details to buy 
something. C does not send the items, and uses D’s credit card details to buy other things. 
 
The second example would be a form of category 6 – customer and merchant exploitation – 
whereas the first example does not fit within the taxonomy. However, although the result is the 
same – the second party obtains credit card details inappropriately – the method is very different. 
This paper will consider online fraud to encompass scams rather than technological attacks, which 
are best thought of as computer misuse. Under this definition, internet fraud is best thought of as 
a ‘computer assisted’ rather than ‘computer orientated’ crime.4 
 
1.1 Common forms 
It is not possible to consider all forms of fraud in this piece, and reference should be made 
elsewhere.5 Instead, brief mention will be made of some of the more common types of online 
fraud. Arguably the most common6 are commerce frauds, confidence frauds, advance fee frauds 
and overpayment. 
 
1.1.1 Commerce frauds 
The most common online fraud according to most state statistics is commerce fraud. This includes 
a number of sub-species, including non-payment, non-delivery and auction frauds. That commerce 
frauds is one of the most common should not be surprising given the growth in e-commerce. It is 
easy to hide behind the appearance of respectability on the internet. An e-shop looks credible, 
whereas the same trader may not look as respectable in real life. Similarly, a picture of a legitimate 
product can be displayed on the internet, while a replica is despatched. A replica in a physical shop 
is easier to detect. 
 
There are numerous examples of commerce frauds, and online auctions provide considerable 
opportunities to commit fraud. They also provide the opportunity for other financial crime, 
including the ‘fencing’ (selling) of stolen goods.7 Aside from non-payment/non-delivery, which 
has been touched on already, a common form of auction fraud is so-called ‘shill bidding’. This is 
where a person establishes a fake profile and bids upon a popular item, never intending that they 
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would win.8 This pushes up the price. If the fake bidder does accidentally win, the person who 
came second will be told that the winner has pulled out, and they can buy the item for their 
previous highest bid. If the fake bidder does not win, then the winner has paid more than they 
needed to. Either-way, therefore, the price could be falsely inflated. 
 
Of course, the interesting argument with shill bidding is the extent to which a fraud has happened. 
Nobody is forcing the (eventual) winner to pay above what she or he wishes to. If they did not 
want to pay a particular price then they could choose not to. Yes, the price is higher because of a 
phantom bid, but ultimately the person continues to pay a price that they are prepared to pay. 
 
1.1.2  Confidence frauds 
Confidence frauds are one of the older forms of internet fraud and arguably one of the nastier 
ones. The name is given because the fraud is based on the perpetrator obtaining the confidence of 
the victim in order to carry out the scam. This could include, for example, a fake business 
relationship where a person believes that they are investing in a legitimate opportunity. They can 
be shown real estate and detailed plans, but when they invest, it turns out that the opportunity was 
never present.9 
 
Perhaps one of the more common forms of confidence frauds that has emerged in recent years, is 
‘romance fraud’. This is where a person is led to believe that they are in a romantic relationship 
with a person, and yet the object of the romance is to cause financial loss to the victim.10 There 
are numerous versions of the romance fraud.11 Some are purely online. The perpetrator and victim 
meet in an online dating site and communicate exclusively by technology. In other situations, there 
may be real-world contact. While the scam will originate online, the perpetrator and victim will 
meet, often having romantic meals and even sexual intercourse, to make the victim believe that 
they are in a true relationship. 
 
When the romance is formed, there will then be an ‘event’ that requires money to be spent. This 
could, for example, involve the scammer travelling to another country where they are allegedly 
injured or arrested, requiring the victim to pay money, either out of love, or because they think 
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they will be repaid by their ‘lover’.12 It is not difficult to fake medical certificates, pictures of 
hospitals or a convincing website for a legal firm that does not exist. Other frauds will exploit the 
victim’s desire to start a life with their supposed lover. The perpetrator will claim to have a house 
that can be sold to provide funds for them to then jointly-purchase a house somewhere else. The 
house requires improvements, but because their capital is tied up in the house, they need the victim 
to pay for the improvements, with them getting the money as equity in the new house. When the 
money is paid, it is apparent that there is no house. 
 
As will be seen later, the consequences of confidence fraud are often significant. It is not just the 
financial loss that the victim faces, but often feelings of betrayal as a result of the breach of personal 
trust inherent within a confidence fraud, or the feelings that one has somehow lost a loved one.13 
 
1.1.3  Advance fee frauds 
Advance fee fraud continues to be one of the more popular forms of internet fraud. It is also a 
type of fraud that everyone with an email address will have probably seen, although not necessarily 
fallen for. Advance fee frauds are often called 419 frauds after the provision of the Nigerian 
Criminal Code that was enacted to tackle these frauds. 
 
The basic 419 fraud is the ‘Nigerian Prince’ or ‘lost-long relative’. The email purports to be from 
a Nigerian prince who requires assistance to move vast sums of money out of the country due to 
corruption. In return for allowing access to their bank account, the victim is told they will receive 
a percentage of the proceeds (or be allowed to keep the interest earned from the sums of money 
in the account).14 
 
Another example is prize draws. A person is told that they have been pre-selected for a (usually 
variable) prize, that requires them to enter a contest. Keen to claim the prize, the victim does not 
question the fact that they have not entered any contest. The other typical example is when a 
person is told that they are the last-surviving relative of a distant cousin, who died without a will. 
The ‘sole beneficiary’ needs to pay fees to unlock the inheritance, something that turns out to be 
false.  
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Advance fee scams divide opinion. They normally rely on the greed of the victims, who are often 
agreeing to do something that is certainly morally ambiguous and, in some instances, would be 
legally wrong (e.g. facilitating the circumvention of money laundering or currency export rules). 
491 scams are often poorly worded,15 causing many to believe that the victims have been silly to 
fall for such scams. As will be seen, victim-blaming is something that is unfortunately found 
throughout online fraud. 
 
1.1.4  Overpayment 
Overpayment is another form of commerce fraud. A person will purchase something valuable 
online. They will normally arrange to collect it in person, sending a representative. When the 
representative comes they will bring a cheque (or bankers draft etc) for a higher amount than the 
purchase price. As they are only a representative, they cannot write another cheque. They have 
travelled some distance and so they cannot return. A compromise is reached whereby the buyer 
will hand over the cheque/bankers draft, and the seller will provide a post-dated cheque for the 
difference. In fact, post-dated cheques do not exist, and can be honoured by banks. Thus the seller 
loses the item and the additional money because the buyer’s cheque/bankers draft is false.16 
 
The same trick can be used with electronic payment systems. The buyer’s representative turns up 
with email proof that funds have been credited to, for example, PayPal. However, the sum is too 
much and thus the seller will either transfer money or give cash/cheque for the difference. The 
buyer will claim to be in a hurry, leading the seller not to check their account balances and to take 
the email at face value. 
 
2. PREVALENCE OF ONLINE FRAUD 
Identifying the prevalence of fraud is extremely challenging. It is known that online fraud is 
chronically under-reported.17 There are a number of reasons why this is the case, including the 
belief that it is complicated, a belief that the amount is trivial, not appreciating that they are victims 
of fraud,18 or, in some instances, embarrassment at being a victim.19 This means that simply relying 
on police reports is too simplistic. 
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Another difficulty in identifying the prevalence of online fraud is that there is no common 
definitions of what constitutes online fraud. This means that countries and organisations are 
counting the same behaviour in different ways. The EU has recognised this, at least, and its new 
Directive20 requires Member States to collect statistics relating to fraud.21 The European 
Commission will identify what statistics are required, and how they are to be gathered. This should 
improve an understanding of reporting, although, as will be seen, the Directive does not 
encompass all forms of online fraud. 
 
The European Central Bank has estimated that card fraud across the Single Euro Payments Area 
in 2016 amounted to €1.8bn, with c.17.3m individual instances of fraud being used.22 The absence 
of central statistics mean that individual statistics need to be considered, but these can be 
illustrative. In England & Wales,23 official statistics suggest that 4.7 million incidents of fraud were 
experienced in the year to September 2017,24 a decrease from pervious years. UK Finance, the 
industry body that represents banks and financial institutions, states that £566m was stolen from 
card-based fraud in 2017.25 That only related to frauds connected to debit or credit cards. An 
additional £121.4m was stolen through online banking,26 and a further £28.4m through telephone-
based fraud.27 In addition, £236m was stolen through so-called ‘authorised push payments’.28 
These are frauds where a person is tricked into sending money to someone who they believe is in 
a position of responsibility (e.g. a person posing as a bank, or a police officer or a government 
department. These statistics show that almost £1bn was stolen in 2017 through online fraud. Yet 
even this is not the full picture. It does not include more personal fraud such as advance fee scams, 
romance frauds or other types of fraud that are based on personal contact rather than, for example, 
a stolen or skimmed debit or credit card. 
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The potential scale of online fraud is vast. However, large figures can sometimes be 
misrepresented. While clearly online fraud has led to large numbers of people losing (collectively) 
large sums of money, the prevalence needs to be put into context. For example, the 17.3m of card 
fraud detected by the ECB needs to be put into the context of the total number of card transactions 
across SEPA being 74.9bn.29 That would mean that only c.0.2% of card transactions were 
fraudulent. The same is true in the USA where card fraud constitutes less than 0.1% of all card 
transactions, with welfare fraud, tax fraud and tax evasion costing society far more.30 It is not just 
card frauds. The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Centre (known as IC3) has estimated that in the USA, 
non-delivery frauds amount to over $183m.31 However, it has been estimated that only 0.6% of 
items on eBay, probably the biggest delivery platform, are deliberately not delivered.32 In other 
words, while online fraud involves large numbers of victims, and vast sums of money, its actual 
prevalence is relatively low, when set in the context of daily global e-commerce. 
 
3. VICTIMS OF INTERNET FRAUD 
Who are the victims of internet fraud? As noted above, although the number of victims is relatively 
high, the actual percentage of people who are victims is relatively small. 
 
In recent years there has been discussion about whether there is a way of predicting which people 
are likely to be the victims of internet fraud. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was noted that those who 
spend a lot of time on the internet and routinely use e-commerce are more likely to be victims.33 
It would be naïve to suggest that everyone who uses the internet is a potential victim, but perhaps 
Pratt et al’s observation is more to do with the fact that those who are internet-savvy may be more 
likely to explore lots of sites to find ‘the best price’, meaning they may stumble across fraudulent 
sites that those who only use mainstream commercial sites would not. Van Wilsem believes that 
victimisation is more common where one’s online presence is more visible through, for example, 
extensive use of social networking.34 
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It has also been suggested that certain types of people are more susceptible to fraud. Many scams, 
for instance, are designed to make people believe that they have an offer that is just for them,35 
which attracts those who are always looking out for ‘a bargain’. Other research has suggested that 
people who are impulsive and those who lack self-control are more likely to be the subject of a 
fraud, as are those who suffer from addictive dispositions.36 Perhaps unsurprising is the conclusion 
that those who are gullible are more likely to be victims.37 
 
3.1 Effect on victims 
How victims feel will differ between persons and frauds. For some victims the effect will be 
minimal. Indeed, with some forms of commerce fraud it is quite possible that where the fraud is a 
small amount of money, the person may well just put the matter down to a ‘bad experience’ and 
not consider themselves defrauded. Where the scam involves larger sums of money then the 
financial loss to the victim can be significant. More than this, however, there is some evidence that 
victims blame themselves for not seeing the scam.38 This blame can lead to victims choosing not 
to report fraud through embarrassment. 
 
Of more concern, however, is the fact that victims of internet fraud are often blamed by others 
for falling for the scams.39 This is not something that would happen in other forms of crime. A 
person who has £500 stolen from them would not ordinarily be blamed, yet someone who has 
£500 taken from them in a fraud is. A common complaint is that victims are greedy.40 The 
argument goes that they are responsible for their own predicament because they tried to go for the 
‘easy win’. Such comments are not infrequently targeted against those who fall victim to 419 scams 
or advance fee frauds. The belief is that a person should know better when chasing something too 
good to be true. 
 
There is also a belief that some victims should be able to see through the fraud.41 Such a reaction 
is contradicted by the points above that many scams involve clever psychology. This belief that 
they will be blamed, however, can be very powerful and ensure that a person will perhaps not 
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disclose that they have been the victim of a fraud.42 Victim blaming is more common in confidence 
frauds, where there is a greater danger that victims will be affected emotionally by what has 
happened, due to the feelings of betrayal.43 Family members of confidence frauds also often react 
badly, believing that their inheritance or support has been compromised.44 The consequences of 
this can be severe, causing some victims to feel that the loss of money is the least important effect.45 
 
4. CRIMINALISING ONLINE FRAUD 
How then should online fraud be tackled? While prevention is important, it ultimately requires the 
establishment of criminal laws. The global nature of online fraud means that it is important that 
there is international consensus on how fraud is defined, and how it will be tackled. 
 
4.1  Cybercrime Convention 
Perhaps the first international instrument of note is the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime.46 
This was the first regional instrument that specifically tackled cybercrime, and from the beginning 
it was intended that online fraud would be covered by the instrument. Article 8 of the Convention 
requires member states to adopt legislative or other measures to prevent the loss of property by: 
 
(a) any input, alteration, deletion or suppression of computer data, [or] 
(b) any interference with the functioning of a computer system. 
 
The emphasis is on interference with data or the functioning of a computer system. This means 
that not all forms of online fraud will fall into this definition. The Cybercrime Convention 
Committee has stated that in their opinion phishing and identity fraud may also be within the 
scope of the Convention,47 although in most instances that is not through Article 8 but by 
reference to the other provisions within the instrument, including hacking.48  
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4.2  EU Legislation 
The EU has recognised the importance of online fraud for some time. Its earliest intervention was 
the Council Framework Decision of 28 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of 
payment.49 Article 3 of the Decision required states to criminalise intentionally ‘performing or 
causing a transfer of money or monetary value and thereby causing an unauthorised property for 
another person, with the intention of procuring an unauthorised economic benefit for the person 
committing the offence’. However, as with the Cybercrime Convention, this was to occur by: 
 
(a) without right introducing, altering, deleting or suppressing data, in particular 
identification data, or 
(b) without right interfering with the functioning of a computer programme or system. 
 
The express inclusion of identity data was welcome as it would include those situations where a 
person uses a stolen credit card to make online purchases. However, the requirement that data or 
a system was altered meant that traditional scams would not be covered by the legislation. 
 
The Framework Decision was starting to show its age and in 2017 the European Parliament sought 
to update it. Ultimately, in 2019, the Directive on combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of 
payment was passed,50 replacing the Framework Decision. The recital specifically makes reference 
to the need to update the law ‘in particular with regard to computer-related fraud’.51  
 
The Directive requires participating member states52 to establish ‘minimum rules concerning the 
definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of fraud and counterfeiting’.53 Note, in 
common with other Directives relating to the criminal law, the Directive sets out a minimum 
standard, and it is open to states to set a higher standard. Six categories of offences are to be 
created: 
 
Art. 3.  Fraudulent use of non-cash payment instruments. 
Art. 4.  Fraudulent use of corporeal non-cash payment instruments. 
Art. 5.  Fraudulent use of non-corporeal non-cash payment instruments. 
                                                 
49 2001/413/JHA. OJ L 149, 02.06.2001. 
50 Directive (EU) 2019/713. OJ L 123/18. 10.5.2019. 
51 Recital (3). 
52 The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark are not bound by the Directive under the terms of Articles 1 and 2 of 
Protocol 21 of the TEU and TFEU (see recital (38) and (39) OJ L 123/23). 
53 Article 1 of Directive 2019/713. 
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Art. 6.  Fraud related to information systems. 
Art. 7.  Tools used for committing offences. 
Art. 8.  Inciting, aiding and abetting and attempt. 
 
While Article 2(a) defines ‘non-cash payment instrument’ it does not do so in a particularly user-
friendly way. Perhaps a better definition is provided by the European Central Bank, who give the 
examples of cards, credit transfers, direct debits and e-money.54 The directive draws a distinction 
between corporeal (meaning, in this context, physical) and non-corporeal forms. Corporeal forms 
would therefore be such things as credit cards, debit cards, traveller cheques etc. Non-corporeal 
forms would be direct debits, standing orders and money transfers. 
 
Article 3 requires the following conduct to be criminalised: 
 
(a) the fraudulent use of a stolen or otherwise unlawfully appropriated or obtained 
non-cash payment instrument; 
(b) the fraudulent use of a counterfeit or falsified non-cash payment instrument. 
 
This, therefore, would require countries to ensure that the use of stolen credit or debit cards, 
vouchers etc. is criminalised. This is unlikely to be problematic, and the vast majority of countries 
will already do this. 
 
Article 4 relates to the fraudulent use of corporeal (physical) non-cash payments and requires the 
following conduct to be criminalised: 
 
(a) their theft or other unlawful appropriation; 
(b) the fraudulent counterfeiting or falsification of an instrument; 
(c) the possession of a stolen or otherwise unlawfully appropriated, or a counterfeit 
or falsified instrument for fraudulent use; 
(d) the procurement for oneself or another, including the receipt, appropriation, 
purchase, transfer, import, export, sale, transport or distribution of a stolen, 
counterfeit or falsified instrument for personal use. 
 
                                                 
54 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/pol/activ/instr/html/index.en.html (Accessed 20.6.19). 
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Where Article 3 relates to the use of the instruments, Article 4 largely prohibits their production 
or acquisition. Thus, the person who steals a payment instrument (e.g. a card) or counterfeits it 
would be within this offence. ‘Counterfeits’ includes those situations where a card is cloned 
through, for example, placing a ‘skimmer’ in the card slot of an ATM. The offence could also be 
used for online fraud. The wording of Article 4(b) includes the falsification of an instrument, and 
thus could include those who procure the details of credit cards etc. through hacking or other 
techniques. The card details constitute a corporeal non-cash payment instrument and remain so 
even though the card is not physically present. This broadens the scope of the offence. 
 
Article 4(c) criminalises those who possess an instrument, but only where it is to be used for a 
fraudulent purpose. Again, reference to ‘falsified’ instrument would capture those who are in 
possession of a cloned card or card details that have been procured online. The falsification would 
be that (a) the user has the right to use it, and (b) that the card is physically present when it is not. 
 
Article 4(d) requires all conduct related to the transfer or trading of instruments to be criminalised, 
so long as it is for the purpose of fraud. From the wording of the paragraph it is clear that it does 
not matter whether the seller intends to commit the fraud, it is sufficient that she is aware that 
someone else will use the instrument for fraudulent purposes. 
 
Article 5 then establishes similar offences for non-corporeal instruments. The following conduct 
is to be criminalised: 
 
(a) the unlawful obtainment of a non-corporeal non-cash payment instrument, at least 
when this obtainment involves the commission of one of the offences referred to 
in articles 3 to 6 of Directive 2013/40/EU, or misappropriation of a non-corporeal 
non-cash payment instrument; 
(b) the fraudulent counterfeiting or falsification of an instrument; 
(c) the holding of an unlawfully obtained, counterfeit or falsified instrument for 
fraudulent use, at least if the unlawful origin is known at the time of the holding of 
the instrument; 
(d) the procurement for oneself or another, including the sale, transfer or distribution, 




Article 5 is more complicated, partly because of the nature of the instruments. However, it is 
establishing broadly similar offences to Article 4. Paragraph (a) is interesting because it, in essence, 
has two alternatives. Member States can choose to criminalise ‘the unlawful obtainment’ of an 
instrument. Reference to ‘unlawful’ makes clear that it will not capture those who obtain it 
legitimately or in a neutral way. The second alternative is to criminalise the unlawful obtainment 
only when it involves the commission of an offence under Directive 2013/40/EU. This is the 
Directive on attacks against information systems,55 which criminalises activity such as access to 
information systems, system interference, data interference and interceptions.56 Relating this to the 
Directive on fraud, the unlawful obtainment of an instrument would be captured where the 
obtainment is through, for example, hacking. 
 
Because Article 5 relates to non-corporeal instruments it is sometimes more difficult to visualise 
what is meant. PayPal would be a good example of a non-corporeal instrument. If, for example, 
D hacked into V’s account and caused a payment of €5,000 to be sent from D’s account to V’s, 
this would be a good example of liability that should be criminalised under Article 5(a). Article 
5(b) criminalises the counterfeiting or falsification of an instrument. This could, for example, cover 
diversion frauds which are becoming popular. Let us take an example: 
 
V is due to sell her house for €250,000. She instructed her lawyers to transfer the money 
into a named bank account. Shortly before the sale, her lawyers receive an email purporting 
to be from her telling them to send the money to a different account. They do so, but the 
email was not from her, and the money has been stolen.57  
 
This would be a good example of someone counterfeiting a non-corporeal instrument. Derivatives 
of this are becoming increasingly common, and thus Article 5(b) is to be welcomed. Articles 5(c) 
and (d) are the equivalent of Article 4(c) and (d) so nothing more will be said on this. 
 
Article 6 criminalises fraud relating to information systems. It requires Member States to 
criminalise: 
 
                                                 
55 Gillespie [12], pp.44-48. 
56 Directive 2013/40/EU, Articles 3-6.  
57 For a real-life example, see https://www.theguardian.com/money/2017/jan/14/lost-67000-
conveyancing-scam-friday-afternoon-fraud-legal-sector-email-hacker (Accessed 22 June 2019). 
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[the] performing or causing a transfer of money, monetary value or virtual currency and 
thereby causing an unlawful loss of property for another person in order to make an 
unlawful gain for the perpetrator or third party…when committed intentionally by: 
 
(a) without right, hindering or interfering with the functioning of an information system; 
(b) without right, introducing, altering, deleting, transmitting or suppressing computer 
data. 
 
This is not dissimilar to Article 5(a) when read in conjunction the Directive on attacks on 
information systems. However, Article 6 is slightly wider and reflects a more updated 
understanding of how fraud through interference can occur. An example of when Article 6 could 
be used would be those instances where malware is used to pollute the DNS of a system, meaning 
when a user tries to access a legitimate (money-transfer) site, they are directed to a fraudulent site 
instead.58 This is interfering with a system and causes the user to suffer property (financial) loss. 
 
4.2.1 Jurisdiction 
As is well known, jurisdiction poses considerable challenges for cybercrime.59  Article 12 of the 
Directive specifically addresses jurisdiction. Article 12(1) requires member states to establish 
jurisdiction where either the offence is committed in whole or in part of its territory, or where the 
offender is one of its nationals. This is then supplemented by Article 12(3) which states that 
Member States can choose to extend jurisdiction where the offender is habitually resident (rather 
than a national) of the state, or where the offence is committed for the benefit of a legal person 
established in its territory. ‘Legal person’ means a company, and, therefore, the implication is that 
jurisdiction should be secured if a company procures the fraud identified above. 
 
Allowing states to assert jurisdiction where the offence takes place ‘in part’ within their territory 
significantly broadens the reach of the various offences. It would, for example, allow a country to 
claim jurisdiction in the following instances: 
 
(i) the perpetrator uses ICT in the territory to commit the fraud; 
(ii) the victim resides in the territory, particularly where the victim is tricked into 
undertaking a positive act, such as sending money, card details etc. 
                                                 
58 Karlof [14]. 
59 For a discussion see Gillespie [12], ch.11. 
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(iii) the victim’s bank is based in the territory; 
(iv) the recipient’s bank is based in the territory. 
 
In many online frauds this will mean that more than one country will be able to assert jurisdiction. 
As the Directive sets out a common framework for the offences, there is unlikely to be any issue 
of dual criminality, which will allow easier cross-border co-operation. However, the Directive is 
silent as to which country can proceed against the defendant. Let us take an example:  
 
D, a French national living in Portugal, hacks into the computer of V, a Belgian national, 
and obtains his credit card details. The credit card is issued from a bank in Luxembourg, 
and D uses it to purchase goods from an online store in Germany. 
 
In this example France, Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany could all potentially claim 
jurisdiction, as it either involves their nationals or the crime took place, in part, in their territory. 
Who should go first? Assuming that the Portuguese police arrest him, should they go first as they 
have custody of the offender? Should it be Germany where the goods are purchased fraudulently, 
or Luxembourg where the card is issues and where, therefore, the financial loss will be recorded? 
The absence of any detail within the Directive means that it will be for the states to negotiate with 
each other. Presumably, the location of the offender, location of relevant evidence and the country 
where the majority of the fraud was conducted will be relevant considerations.  
 
4.2.2 Does this Directive tackle online fraud? 
While the Directive is comprehensive, does it tackle online fraud? The answer would appear to be 
that it tackles some online fraud, but in other instances it does not. The Directive primarily tackles 
the falsification and forgery of payment methods. To that extent it can be said that it covers most 
types of the payment frauds identified earlier. Where a person clones, for example, a debit card or 
credit card, then that will be a criminal offence, as will its sale, procurement and use. Similarly, 
where a person creates a false money transfer mandate then that will come within the Directive. 
 
What of the other types of online fraud? For example, what of auction fraud? If a person lists an 
item that is not actually available, does this come within the Directive? It is not obvious from the 
face of the Directive that it is, but the recital suggests the issue is more complicated. Recital (11) 
states that ‘sending fake invoices to obtain payment credentials should be considered as an attempt 
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at unlawful appropriation’.60 The wording of the recital should be noted. It refers to sending fake 
invoices to obtain the credentials. This could include, for example, card details, bank account 
details or PayPal instructions. However, the emphasis is on the credentials. So if the credentials 
are obtained through fake invoices with the intention of then using them later fraudulently, this 
would constitute an offence under either Article 4(a) or 5(a) of the Directive, because the 
credentials become an instrument. Where those accrued credentials are used fraudulently, then it 
becomes an offence under Article 3. What of the situation where the credentials are not accrued, 
it is the payment itself that is accrued? In those circumstances it is not obvious that an offence takes 
place. Articles 3, 4 and 5 refer to accruing an instrument and the payment is not an instrument.  
 
The same position is undoubtedly true of confidence frauds. In those instances, a person will 
typically send the fraudster some money. The instrument is neither stolen, falsified or counterfeit. 
The victim intends to send the fraudster some money: they have been tricked into believing that 
the transfer is legitimate. That is undoubtedly fraud, but it is not within the Directive. The same is 
true of Advance Fee Frauds (‘419 frauds’) where, again, the reason for transfer is deliberate but 
the actual transfer is legitimate.61 Again, without a stolen, falsified or counterfeit instrument then 
it does not fall within the Directive. 
 
It is easy to see why the Directive does not cater for such matters, as the Directive was replacing 
the earlier Framework Decision that also did not include them. However, since 2001 (when the 
Framework Decision was passed) and 2019 (when the Directive was passed) our understanding of 
online fraud has become more sophisticated. The Directive could, and should, have been expanded 
to cover the common forms of online fraud. That would ensure that EU citizens are given a 
minimal level of protection. By not doing so, there is a risk that some countries will not consider 




Online fraud continues to be one of the most prolific cybercrimes. It is also a crime that perhaps 
has the widest scope. A fraud can range from €5 to €500m. Indeed, some suggest that small-
amount frauds are the most rewarding because people will not go through the hassle of trying to 
                                                 
60 OJ L123/19. 10.5.2019. 
61 Chang [4]. 
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reclaim a small amount of money. If thousands of people feel the same way, then the small amount 
multiplied by thousands of people suddenly becomes a large amount.62  
 
The transnational nature of online fraud poses challenge for existing legal instruments. Without a 
common definition of online fraud, it can be difficult to secure the custody of the offender. The 
Directive will ensure that all countries within the Union have the same basic structure. More than 
this, the Directive sets out a minimum threshold for the maximum sentence,63 and it is perhaps no 
coincidence that the threshold is set at between one- and five-years’ imprisonment. This means 
that the offences will come within the European Arrest Warrant scheme, ensuring that it will be 
simpler to obtain the custody of someone accused of committing online fraud within the EU. 
 
The Directive is, therefore, to be welcomed in that it sets out a minimum degree of protection 
across the Union. However, as noted above, it does not include all forms of online fraud, and that 
is a mistake. Online fraud undermines the single market. This is particularly true of commerce 
fraud, but it can also be true of confidence frauds, which may make people more sceptical of 
engaging in e-commerce. There is a need to harmonise the laws relating to this type of fraud too. 
The Union could, and should, have set out a minimum framework to protect all victims of online 
fraud from the most common types of online fraud.  
 
Care must be taken to ensure that new laws do not create false hope. The sheer volume of online 
fraud means that few reports are ever dealt with, and yet this can lead to resentment and frustration 
by those who are victims.64 Effectively tackling online fraud requires all parties, including law 
enforcement, private citizens, business and the financial industry to come together to understand 
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